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Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
 
Diese Arbeit charakterisiert die Gestaltung langfristiger Verträge in einem Monopolmarkt, in 
dem nur informierte Konsumenten bei Vertragsabschluss wissen, ob ihre Nachfrage hoch oder 
niedrig sein wird. Zunächst uninformierte Konsumenten haben die Möglichkeit, ihre 
Nachfrage schon bei Vertragsabschluss zu lernen, dies ist jedoch mit Opportunitätskosten 
verbunden. Das Unternehmen bietet aus seiner Sicht optimale Verträge an. Diese haben die 
Eigenschaft, dass informierte Konsumenten einfach strukturierte Verträge abschließen, 
während zunächst uninformierte Konsumenten komplexere Verträge abschließen, die es ihnen 
erlaubt, die vertraglich zugesicherte Menge nachträglich anzupassen. Das Vorhandensein 
dieser uninformierten Konsumenten macht es für das Unternehmen schwieriger, Renten bei 
den informierten Konsumenten abzuschöpfen, die niedrige Nachfrage haben. Das Angebot, 
das für diese informierten Konsumenten gedacht ist, wird deshalb in seiner Menge nach unten 
verzerrt. Möglicherweise werden diese Konsumenten sogar ganz vom Markt ausgeschlossen. 
 
In diesem Rahmen wird der Effekt von Informationsvermittlung an uninformierte 
Konsumenten untersucht. Es ist zu beobachten, dass Konsumenten, die weiterhin uninformiert 
bleiben, immer von der Präsenz zusätzlicher informierter Konsumenten profitieren, obwohl 
Information eines Konsumenten hier lediglich direkt für die eigene individuelle Nachfrage 
relevant ist. Allerdings steigert mehr Information im Markt nicht notwendigerweise die 
Wohlfahrt, insbesondere weil Verzerrungen der Verträge, die im Mark angeboten werden, 
verstärkt  werden. Auch leiden unter bestimmten Bedingungen die ursprünglich bereits 
informierten Konsumenten unter mehr Information im Markt. 
Nontechnical Summary 
 
This paper characterizes a firm’s optimal offer of service plans in a monopoly market. In this 
market only informed customers know already at the contracting stage whether their demand 
is high or low, while uninformed customers may learn their demand only after incurring some 
costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, those who are still 
uninformed purchase tariffs that subsequently allow them to more flexibly adjust their 
consumed quantity of the service. The presence of uninformed costumers makes it more 
costly for the firm, in terms of rent left to consumers, to offer the most basic package, which 
is purchased by informed low-demand customers. Consequently, the firm makes this package 
relatively unattractive, resulting in a very low quantity of the consumed service. 
 
We find that uninformed customers benefit from the presence of informed customers, even 
though information only helps to predict a customer’s own demand. However, welfare may be 
lower if there are more informed customers or if acquiring information already at the 
contracting stage becomes less costly for uninformed customers. Also, already informed 
customers may suffer from the presence of additional informed customers. 
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Abstract
We characterize a monopolist’s optimal offer of service plans when only informed
customers know already at the contracting stage whether their demand is high or
low, while uninformed customers may learn their demand only after incurring some
costs, if at all. While informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, those who are
still uninformed purchase tariffs that subsequently allow them to more flexibly adjust
their consumed quantity of the service. The presence of uninformed costumers makes
it more costly for the firm, in terms of rent left to consumers, to offer the most basic
package, which is purchased by informed low-demand customers. Consequently, the
firm makes this package relatively unattractive, resulting in a very low quantity of
the consumed service.
We find that uninformed customers benefit from the presence of informed cus-
tomers, even though information only helps to predict a customer’s own demand.
However, welfare may be lower if there are more informed customers or if acquir-
ing information already at the contracting stage becomes less costly for uninformed
customers.
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1 Introduction
We consider subscribers’ choice between different service plans when at least some of them
do not yet know their future demand. Customers’ choice could be between different fixed
or mobile telephone call plans or contracts for the supply of electricity or other utilities. At
the time that a particular service is chosen, some customers may be well informed about
their future usage. For other customers, this may not be possible at all as their future
demand is much less predictable.1 While their demand may be predictable based on past
consumption, customers may have only little recollection of their past usage of the service
or they may subscribe for the first time. Once signed up for the service, however, also
previously uninformed customers learn their respective level of demand over the duration
of the contract.
We analyze the pricing problem of a monopolistic firm. As a first benchmark, if all
customers were ex-ante uninformed about their future demand, the optimal menu would
specify first-best consumption levels and would allow the firm to extract all consumer rent.
As a second benchmark, if initially all customers already knew their demand type, the
consumption level of customers with low demand would be distorted downwards, provided
low-type customers are served at all. In this paper, we are concerned, instead, with
the case where initially both informed and uninformed customers are present. We find
that informed customers purchase simpler tariffs, while those who are still uninformed
subscribe to tariffs that subsequently allow to more flexibly adjust the consumed quantity
of the service.2 Contracts for all low-demand customers are more distorted than in the two
benchmark cases: both the contracts for informed low-demand customers, compared to
the standard "screening" benchmark, where all customers are informed, and the contracts
for uninformed low-demand customers, compared to the benchmark where all customers
are uninformed.
Due to the presence of uninformed customers, it is optimal for the supplier to make the
"basic" package that is intended for informed low-demand customers particularly unattrac-
tive, resulting in a very low quantity. This is a consequence of the incentive constraints
1For instance, depending on life circumstances as well as housing conditions, a customer’s demand for
electricity may be more variable than that of other customers.
2As evidence from the marketing literature shows (e.g., Lambrecht et al. 2007; Narayanan et al.
2007), for different subscription services firms’ range of offers seems to indeed take into account that some
customers are originally less certain about their future demand than others.
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across informed and uninformed customers. Uninformed customers may also pick any of
the contracts designed for informed customers. Their “safest” choice is, however, the low-
demand type’s contract, as they can then still realize strictly positive consumer rent if they
end up being of the high-demand type. By making the offer for informed low-demand cus-
tomers less attractive, the firm can extract a higher price also from uninformed customers.
The offer for informed low-demand customers may also still affect the rent of informed
high-demand customers, though this may work indirectly, namely through the incentives
of informed high-demand customers to mimic uninformed customers.
In an extension of the model, uninformed customers can learn their future demand
(type) already at the stage of contracting, albeit only after incurring costs. This could
involve the time and effort spent on going through past bills or thinking ahead about
future consumption needs. If these costs are low, this additionally constrains the firm’s
offers. Intuitively, as costs become smaller, contracts designed for informed and uninformed
customers become more similar. As we show, the simultaneous presence of both informed
and uninformed customers also leads to welfare results that are in striking contrast to
those in the seminal paper by Crémer and Khalil (1992).3 If there are only uninformed
customers, as in their paper, then welfare is strictly lower as costs of information acquisition
decrease. While results are generally ambiguous in our model, for a (standard) linear-
quadratic functional specification, which allows to obtain explicit solutions, the opposite
holds: welfare is higher as costs of information acquisition decrease.
Interestingly, the presence of informed customers affects the utility of uninformed cus-
tomers even though a customer’s information only relates to her own demand (and not,
say, to some "shared" aspects such as the availability of different, competitive offers). As
is shown, as more customers become informed, this may also benefit those who stay un-
informed. Policies intended to assist customers in making more informed decisions may
thus benefit all costumers, including those who stay uninformed.4.
3Compare also more generally the literature on mechanism design with endogenous information acqui-
sition as surveyed in Bergemann and Välimäki (2006). There is also a strand of the literature in which
the principal (i.e., the firm in our model) has information or can at costs acquire information about the
characteristics of the good and must decide whether to share this with the agents (i.e., the consumers in
our model). See, in particular, Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006).
4With the deregulation of many utilities, including fixed line telephone, electricity, or gas, public
agencies have set up internet services to assist households with their decision making. For instance,
they may provide “calculators” that force households to key in an expected demand profile and, thereby,
calculate their expected bill for a given tariff. In addition, these websites often offer price comparison
services as well.
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The feature that at least some customers may learn more about their willingness to
pay after signing a contract relates our paper to the literature on "sequential screening"
(cf. Courty and Li, 2000).5 More recently, in Matthews and Persico (2007) customers can
become, albeit again at a cost, earlier informed about their willingness to pay. Besides
the fact that in our model informed and uninformed customers coexist, our contribution
differs also in that we focus on multi-unit purchases and thus on the optimal design of
non-linear contracts.6
Finally, there is also a small but growing literature that combines demand uncertainty
with behavioral "biases" such as overconfidence, procrastination, projection bias, etc. In
Grubb (2007) customers underestimate the variability of their future demand. While they
may differ in their prior estimate of having lower or higher demand, they do not differ
with respect to how knowledgeable they are with respect to future demand. In Uthemann
(2005) customers have biased priors about having low or high demand later, similar to
Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), where they have in addition time-inconsistent preferences. In
all these papers, contract design is driven by firms’ attempt to extract profits through
catering to customers’ distorted beliefs.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. Section
3 contains the analysis with informed and uninformed customers who may have low or high
demand. Section 4 provides some results on comparatives statics, while Section 5 extends
the analysis by allowing uninformed customers to acquire information, albeit at costs,
before choosing from the offered contracts. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated
to the Appendix.
5Cf. also Baron and Besanko (1984), Riordan and Sappington (1987), as well as Miravete (1996, 2005).
Miravete (1996) is of particular interest as this paper also considers non-linear pricing: Consumers have
ex-ante knowledge about their demand function, which together with some additional “shock” generates
their willingness to pay at the time of consumption.
6In Lewis and Sappington (1997) there are also both informed and uninformed agents, though there
the focus is on how to elicit from the informed agent (more) effort that goes into the acquisition of
information that is of direct relevance for the principal. Somewhat more closely related, in Dai, Lewis,
and Lopomo (2006) agents differ initially in the precision with which they can later forecast their costs
of production. In our setting, however, the better information that some agents have ex-ante creates also
ex-ante heterogeneity in a second dimension: low- and high-demand types. (Consequently, in our model
offers to both informed and uninformed agents will be distorted, while in their model only the menu offered
to the less knowledgeable agent is inefficient.)
3
2 The Model
Consider a monopolistic firm offering a long-term service contract to customers. Though
our model applies to many different settings, as discussed in the Introduction, it may be
convenient in what follows to have in mind an application to mobile call plans.
The firm has constant marginal cost c˜. A customer of (real-valued) demand type θ,
which can be low or high with 0 < θl < θh, derives gross utility θu˜(q) from consuming
q "units" (e.g., minutes) of the particular service. Here, the continuously differentiable
function u˜(q) is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave with u˜(0) = 0. It is con-
venient to additionally invoke the (standard) boundary conditions limq↓0 u˜0(q) = ∞ and
limq→∞ u˜0(q) = 0, which together imply that the first-best level of service will be both
finite and strictly positive for any choice θ > 0 and c˜. We also suppose that eu is twice
continuously differentiable.
Before proceeding with the description of the model, it is useful to rephrase the cus-
tomer’s choice problem. Instead of choosing quantity q, we suppose that the customer
selects a certain level of gross "base utility" u = u˜(q). Since u˜ can be inverted, we define
C(u) := c˜u˜−1(u) = c˜q. That is, to generate customer utility of θu the firm must incur the
cost C(u). The invoked properties of u˜(q) imply that C(u) is strictly increasing and strictly
convex with C 0(0) = limu↓0C 0(u) = 0. Denote total surplus by s(u; θ) := θu−C(u), which
for θi is uniquely maximized by some bounded and strictly positive value uFBi , i = h, l.
Note that 0 < uFBl < u
FB
h .
Suppose that there is mass one of customers. The ex-ante probability with which an
individual customer ultimately has high demand is given by μ ∈ (0, 1). The key departure
from the extant literature is that only the fraction π of customers initially know their type.
Later, at the stage of consumption, all customers become informed about their type. (In
Section 5 an uninformed customer may also learn his type early, albeit only at costs.) The
state of a customer’s knowledge is his private information.
Without loss of generality we can restrict consideration to the following set of offers.
For ex-Ante informed customers, the firm designates at most two different consumption
profiles uA,i and respective transfers tA,i, where i = l, h. For only ex-Post informed
customers the firm specifies instead a menu of two options: {(uP,i, tP,i)}i=l,h. Each customer
decides which, if any, contract to sign. Note that while contracts (uA,i, tA,i) specify a fixed
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allowance, the menu {(uP,i, tP,i)}i=l,h still allows for flexibility: The customer pays tP,l
for an allowance up to uP,l, while if she wants to consume more, she can purchase the
additional allowance uP,h − uP,l at an incremental price of tP,h − tP,l.7
3 Analysis of the Optimal Contract
3.1 Benchmarks
With only informed customers, the firm would face a standard screening problem to choose
contracts (uA,i, tA,i). With net utility levels VA,i := θiuA,i − tA,i, the incentive constraint
of the high-demand type, ICA,h, becomes VA,h ≥ θhuA,l − tA,l; the individual rationality
constraint of the low-demand type, IRA,l, becomes VA,l ≥ 0. It is well-known that both
constraints bind at the optimal offer. Moreover, all other constraints can be ignored,
while the high type consumes the first-best service level, uA,h = uFBh . High-demand
customers realize a rent equal to uA,l(θh − θl), where the optimal service level for low-
demand customers, uA,l = uSl , solves
s0(uSl ; θl) =
μ
1− μ(θh − θl) (1)
whenever this is positive, while otherwise uSl = 0. Substituting C
0(0) = 0 such that
s0(0; θl) = θl, we have from (1) that uSl > 0 holds strictly if and only if μ < θl/θh.
As a second benchmark, suppose that all customers are uninformed (π = 0). In this
case, customers’ individual rationality constraint need only be satisfied in expectation:
IRP with μVP,h + (1− μ)VP,l ≥ 0, where VP,i := θiuP,i − tP,i. By optimality for the firm,
IRP binds and both consumption profiles are efficient, uP,i = uFBi . Finally, with discrete
types there is some freedom in specifying the optimal transfers, which have to satisfy IRP
as well as both ex-post incentive compatibility constraints: ICP,i with VP,i ≥ θiuP,j − tP,j.
For instance, one possibility is to choose transfers that reflect incremental costs: tP,h−tP,l =
C(uFBh )− C(uFBl ).
3.2 The Firm’s Program with Informed and Uninformed Cus-
tomers
With both informed and uninformed customers present, the firm faces an additional set
of incentive compatibility constraints across the respective offers, which we denoted by
7This contract is thus similar to a "three-part tariff" contract.
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subscripts A (for the ex-ante informed customers) and P (for the only ex-post informed
customers). We will show that we can ignore the possibility of informed low-demand
customers mimicking uninformed customers, while we refer to the respective ("cross")
constraint of informed high-demand customers, VA,h ≥ VP,h, as ICCA,h. Next, for an
uninformed customer, who is supposed to pick the menu {(uP,i, tP,i)}i=l,h, we suppose first
that only the option to mimic the informed low-demand type may become attractive. We
refer to this ("cross") constraint as ICCP :
μVP,h + (1− μ)VP,l ≥ μ (θhuA,l − tA,l) + (1− μ)VA,l.
As is usual, we will later show that the solution to the "relaxed program" satisfies all
neglected constraints, i.e., including the constraint that the uninformed customer may
want to mimic the informed high-demand customer.
Summing up, with both informed and uninformed customers present, the firm faces
the following (relaxed) program. The firm chooses contracts to maximize expected profits
π {μ [tA,h − C(uA,h)] + (1− μ) [tA,l − C(uA,l)]}
+(1− π) {μ [tP,h − C(uP,h)] + (1− μ) [tP,l − C(uP,l)]}
subject to the following set of constraints: (i) The downward incentive compatibility con-
straints for both informed and uninformed customers ICA,h and ICP,h (as introduced in
the benchmarks of Section 3.1); (ii) the individual rationality constraints for the informed
low-type customer IRA,l and the uninformed customer IRP (as also introduced in Section
3.1)); and (iii) the two "cross" incentive compatibility constraints, namely for the unin-
formed customer ICCP and the informed high-type customer ICCA,h. In addition, note
that all u must be non-negative.8
We characterize the optimal contract in several steps. We first solve the firm’s program
under the assumption that all customers purchase a positive level of services so that u·,i > 0.
Here, we encounter two cases, to which we refer to as Cases 1 and 2. Subsequently, we
8To save space, we have chosen not to first write out explicitly the full program. Note, however,
that in the relaxed program the following constraints are ignored: the downward incentive compatibility
constraints; the individual rationality constraint for the high type; the constraint that an informed low
type does not want to mimic an uninformed low type; the constraint that an uninformed consumer does
not want to mimic the informed high type; the constraint that an informed low type does not want to
mimic an uninformed high type; and the constraint that an informed high type does not want to mimic
an uninformed low type.
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show that there are two more cases possible, Cases 3 and 4, in which not all customers are
served. Finally, we derive conditions for when Cases 1-4 apply.
3.3 Preliminary Results
Suppose first that all customers purchase a strictly positive level of services. In this case,
the following characterization for the optimal contracts obtains.
Proposition 1 The optimal offer under which all customers purchase a positive level of
services has the following properties:
Case 1) If π ≥ 1
2−μ , the firm offers the same contracts to informed and uninformed cus-
tomers. These are the "standard screening" contracts: u·,h = uFBh and u·,l = u
S
l .
Case 2) If instead π < 1
2−μ holds, then only high-demand customers receive the same
contract regardless of whether they are informed or not, which satisfies uP,h = uA,h =
uFBh . Instead, the contract for the informed low type is more distorted than that for the
uninformed low type: uA,l < uSl < uP,l < u
FB
l .
Recall for Case 2 that uSl denotes the distorted consumption level for low-demand
types under a "standard screening" contract (cf. in Section 3.1 the case with π = 1). The
key for Proposition 1 are the two "cross" constraints. To see this, we first compare the
characterization in Proposition 1 with the outcome of the two benchmark cases with only
uninformed customers (π = 0) or only informed customers (π = 1). While for π = 0 the
first-best allocation results, in the presence of both informed and uninformed customers
the distortion of uP,l follows from the constraint ICCA,h, which requires that an informed
high-demand customer does not want to mimic an uninformed customer. Compared to
the case with π = 1, where there are only informed customers, uA,l becomes even further
distorted in Case 2 of Proposition 1, in which the two incentive constraints across informed
and uninformed customers, ICCA,h and ICCP , bind.
We provide next more details. If the uninformed customer picks the informed low-type
customers contract, thus violating ICCP , she realizes a rent of (θh−θl)uA,l if she ultimately
turns out to have high demand. The level of uA,l determines also the rent of an informed
high-type customer, albeit in Case 2 this does not follow from the ("standard") constraint
ICA,h, which remains slack, but instead more indirectly as both ICCA,h and ICCP , bind.
Trading off the objective to minimize these rents with the objective to maximize the surplus
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s(uA,l; θl), the proof of Proposition 1 shows that uA,l solves
s0(uA,l; θl) =
μ
1− μ
1− π + πμ
π
(θh − θl). (2)
Comparing this to (1) confirms uA,l < uSl for Case 2, where π <
1
2−μ . Next, it is also
through the binding constraint ICCP that a higher level of uP,l allows customers, namely
informed-high type customers, to extract a higher rent. Taking this into account, uP,l
optimally trades off surplus maximization with rent extraction if
s0(uP,l; θl) = μ
π
1− π (θh − θl). (3)
Comparing this to (1) confirms uP,l > uSl for Case 2.
We suppose next that not all customers are served. Here, we have to distinguish
between two cases: In Case 3 all low-type customers are excluded, whereas in Case 4 only
those who are also informed are excluded.
Proposition 2 If not all customers are served under the optimal offer, then all high-
demand customers purchase the first-best level of services, u·,h = uFBh , under the same
condition. For low-demand customers, the following cases are possible:
Case 3) Here, all low-demand customers are excluded.
Case 4) Here, only informed low-demand customers are excluded, while uninformed low-
demand customers purchase an inefficiently low level of services, 0 < uP,l < uFBl .
Of particular interest is Case 4 in Proposition 2. There, by no longer serving informed
low-type customers, the firm can extract all consumer surplus from uninformed customers.
The optimal choice of uP,l for low-demand uninformed customer trades off surplus max-
imization with rent extraction from now only informed high-demand customers. This is
the same trade-off as in Case 2 of Proposition 1, which is why uP,l is again determined
from the first-order condition (3).
3.4 Solution to the Firm’s Problem
Which of the different cases that were characterized in Propositions 1 and 2 apply depends
on the fractions of the different types of customers.
Proposition 3 Which of the characterized four cases applies depends as follows on the
fractions of the different customer types:
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Case 4                          Case 3
Case 2                         Case 1


Figure 1: Optimal contracts for θh = 3/4 and θl = 1/2.
i) Suppose that the fraction of high-demand customers is low with μ < θl/θh: In this case,
uninformed low-type customers always purchase a positive quantity. If, for given μ, the
fraction of informed customers π is low, then informed low-demand customers are excluded
(Case 4). Otherwise, all customers are served, with Case 1 applying for high values of π
and Case 2 for intermediate values.
ii) Suppose instead that μ ≥ θl/θh: Then for given μ all low-type customers are excluded if
π is sufficiently high (Case 3). For lower values of π, however, only informed low-demand
customers are excluded (Case 4).
We illustrate this in Figure 1 (which is drawn for the particular values θh = 3/4 and
θl = 1/2). Furthermore, the respective thresholds for μ and π that determine which of the
four cases apply are given explicitly in the proof of Proposition 3. We next provide more
intuition for the case distinction in Proposition 3.
The role of the fraction μ of high-demand customers is intuitive and standard: As there
are more customers with high demand, it becomes more likely that low-demand types are
excluded so that the firm can extract more rents from high-demand types. Hence, when
moving upwards in Figure 1, we move from Cases 1 and 2 to Case 3 and 4, respectively.
Next, if μ is high but also π low, implying that there altogether few informed customers,
it is intuitive that only informed low types but not uninformed low types are excluded.
Hence, as we move to the left in Figure 1, while staying in the upper part, we move from
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Case 3 to Case 4, implying that fewer types are excluded. Interestingly, the opposite holds
in the lower part of Figure 1, i.e., for relatively low values of μ. There, with only few
high-type customers, as there are more uninformed customers (lower π), the offer made to
informed low-demand customers becomes increasingly distorted in an attempt to extract
more rents from uninformed customers. Ultimately, as π becomes too low, informed low-
demand customers no longer purchase a positive quantity, i.e., we move from Case 2 to
Case 4.
For simplicity, Proposition 3 was phrased mainly in terms of high or low values of π. To
see how the respective boundaries that separate the four cases change in both parameters π
and μ, it is again instructive to consult Figure 1: As is shown in the proof of Proposition 3,
the respective monotonicity of the boundaries that is displayed in Figure 1 holds generally.
Before providing a further discussion of the solution to the firm’s program in the following
Section, the rest of the present Section makes more formal how the boundaries of the cases
behave.
For this recall first that in the "standard screening problem" a horizontal line with
μ = θl/θh separates the case where all customers are served from that where only high-
demand customers are served. This line separates Cases 1 and 3 in Figure 1. From
Proposition 1 we have next that Cases 1 and 2 are separated by a function that we denote
by eπ12 = 1/(2−μ). Applying a similar notation, we have that eπ24 separates Cases 2 and 4,
while eπ34 separates Cases 3 and 4. Note that eπ24 is determined from the requirement that
uA,l = 0 holds in Case 2, where uA,l is strictly decreasing in μ but strictly increasing in π.
This implies that eπ24 is indeed upward sloping as a function of μ, as depicted in Figure
1. Finally, the boundary between Cases 3 and 4, eπ34, is obtained from setting uP,l = 0 in
Case 4. As uP,l is more distorted as there are more informed customers and more high-type
customers, eπ34 is strictly decreasing in μ.
3.5 Further Discussion
Serving informed customers with low demand comes at high opportunity costs to the
firm in terms of lost profits with both informed high-demand customers and uninformed
customers. Optimally, the firm thus makes the corresponding “basic” contract (uA,l, tA,l)
relatively unattractive, in particular if the fraction of uninformed customers or that of
high-demand customers are relatively high.
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Corollary 1 Suppose Cases 2 or 4 apply. Then as the fraction of uninformed customers or
of high-demand customers increases (lower π or higher μ, respectively), the more unattrac-
tive becomes the “basic” tariff, which is offered to informed low-demand customers. This
results first in a lower level of uA,l and ultimately in the exclusion of these customers
(corresponding to uA,l = 0).
Once the way incentive constraints bind in our model has been worked out, Corollary
1 follows intuitively from standard principles of models of screening. From an ex-ante
perspective, in this case informed low-demand types end up representing the “bottom
type”, while uninformed customers and high-demand informed customers represent the
respective “adjacent higher” types. As all “adjacent downwards” incentive compatibility
constraints bind, the distortion “at the bottom” increases as the probabilities of the “higher
types” increase (specifically, through an increase in μ or π).9
For what follows, note further that an uninformed customer generates (weakly) higher
revenues for the firm compared to an informed customer.
Corollary 2 Suppose Cases 2 or 4 apply. Then the firm realizes always strictly higher rev-
enues from an uninformed customer than from an informed customer, both in expectation
(over high- and low-demand types) and when considering only low-demand customers.
Recall for Corollary 2 that high-type customers always obtain the same ex-post contract
with u·,h = uFBh and tA,h = tP,h. From the customer’s side, it is from Corollary 2 also
immediate that an informed customer is better off (strictly for Cases 2 and 4). In particular,
note that uninformed low-demand customers end up realizing strictly negative utility:
VP,l < 0.10 Clearly, from an ex-ante perspective, uninformed low-demand customers would
thus have been better advised to purchase instead the “basic” tariff (uA,l, tA,l). However,
given their own initial demand uncertainty, the offer designed for uninformed customers
was equally attractive as it also contained the option to make use of an additional allowance
uFBh − uP,l > 0 at an incremental price tP,h− tP,l that is smaller than the respective utility
increment θh(uFBh − uP,l).
9Though consumers differ along two dimensions in our model, i.e., whether they have high or low
demand and whether they are initially informed or uninformed, from an ex-ante perspective there are only
three distinct types. This is different in standard problems of multi-dimensional screening (cf. Amstrong
and Rochet 1999).
10Cf. also Miravete (1996).
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4 Comparative Analysis
Given the explicitly characterized solution to the firm’s program in Propositions 1, 2,
and 3, the present model lends itself to some further comparative analysis. This section
conducts such an analysis in terms of an increase in the share of informed customers π.
This analysis seems interesting for the following reasons. First, in the light of results
from other models, which we review below, it is interesting to analyze how the presence
of (more) informed customers affects the utility of those who are less informed (though
they do not suffer from any other, exploitable behavioral biases). Second, as noted in
the Introduction, public policy in some recently deregulated industries aims to encourage
customers to become more knowledgeable, including about their own demand profile.11
The comparative analysis in π may help to shed more light on the implications of such
policies.
From implicitly differentiating (3) for uP,l and using uP,h = uFBh , it follows that the
expected service level of uninformed customers decreases as there are more informed cus-
tomers (higher π). Still, it turns out that uninformed customers are then better off. This
holds strictly for Case 2, where it follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 1.
Precisely, this holds as the lowest service level uA,l increases in π, which through the bind-
ing ("cross") constraint ICCP leads to a higher rent for uninformed customers. (For all
other cases uninformed customers’ utility is constant in π.12)
Corollary 3 As the fraction of informed customers increases (higher π), uninformed cus-
tomers’ utility increases.
Note that a customer’s information is only with respect to her own demand type. Still,
if any given customer (exogenously) turns from uninformed to informed, this increases both
his own utility as well as that of customers who still remain uninformed.13 The mechanism
through which the presence of informed customers benefits those who are uninformed
11In our monopolistic setting we can abstract from other, more well known implications of such policies,
which serve to induce more effective competition by reducing search (and/or switching) costs (cf. the
literature discussed below).
12Precisely, recall that Case 2 applies for intermediate values of π, provided that μ is not too high. (Cf.
also Figure 1.) For low values of π, where Case 4 applies instead, uninformed customers realize zero rent,
while for high π, where Case 1 applies and uninformed customers realize the highest rent, we know that
a further increase in π does not affect contracts and thus utilities. Finally, for high μ, where only Cases 3
and 4 apply as π changes, uninformed customers always realize zero utility.
13Strictly speaking, this applies only if the change occurs to a positive mass of customers.
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differs from the mechanism that is at work in models with search and shopping costs,
where the presence of customers who are better informed about rivals’ offers brings down
expected prices (cf. Varian 1980; or more recently Janssen and Moraga-González 2004).14
Formally, the result from Corollary 3 can be also restated in the following way. Recall
that once the way incentive constraints in Case 2 bind has been worked out, uninformed
customers represent the "intermediate type" in a standard screening model, with informed
low- and high-demand types representing the "top" and "bottom types", respectively. The
respective ex-ante probabilities of these "types" are (1 − μ)π ("bottom"), 1 − π ("inter-
mediate"), and μπ ("top"). As π increases, the rent of uninformed customers is affected
in the following way through the chosen service level "at the bottom", uA,l. First, as the
probability of the "bottom type" increases, the distortion "at the bottom" is optimally
decreased, resulting in more rent for all "higher types". Second, as the probability of the
"intermediate type" decreases, this reduces the firm’s benefits from extracting rent, which
further pushes up uA,l. On the other hand, however, the third effect goes in the opposite
direction: As a higher π increases the probability of the "top type", this increases the ben-
efits from rent extraction "at the top", which pushes down uA,l (next to uP,l). Corollary 3
shows that the first two effects together dominate.
Corollary 3 may also be interesting in the light of frequent claims that more informed
or sophisticated customers are cross-subsidized at the cost of less informed customers. For
instance, in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) this holds, albeit under competition, if only some
customers are knowledgeable about their future demand of an “add-on service”, while other
customers are "naively" unaware of this. In a monopolistic context and with perfectly
rational customers, Corollary 3 provides a different benchmark, where the presence of
informed customers benefits uninformed customers.15
The present comparative analysis still ignores the impact of a change in π on all (other)
14Interestingly, in Anderson and Renault (2000), where customers may lack information about “match
value”, which is again specific, a greater share of informed customers has a negative externality through
increasing the prevailing price.
15With perfect competition, all contracts would be undistorted in our model, while high- and low-demand
types would realize the same surplus irrespective of whether they are initially informed or not. From the
arguments in Armstrong and Vickers (2001) and Rochet and Stole (2002) it could be conjectured that as
long as the market remains fully covered and as long as horizontal differentiation is “type-independent”
(i.e., additive), price differences only reflect cost differences. However, if these two conditions do not
jointly hold, then under imperfect competition there remains scope for profitable price discrimination (cf.
also Stole 1995 and Inderst 2004.) An analysis of imperfect competition in this sense is beyond the scope
of the paper.
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informed customers. This is generally ambiguous. To explore this, note first that in
Cases 1 and 3 π has no effect on contracts and thus utilities. Next, in Case 4, where
only informed low-demand customers are excluded, the impact of a higher π on informed
high-demand customers is unambiguous: As their fraction increases (higher π), the firm
optimally extracts more rent (at the cost of a lower surplus realized with uninformed
customers). Finally, in the remaining Case 2 all customers are served. Here, the utility of
informed high-demand customers, VA,h, depends (positively) on both uA,l and uP,l through
the binding constraints ICCP (the "cross" constraint to the uninformed customers’s menu),
ICP,l (the constraint in the menu), and ICCA,h (the "cross" constraint for uninformed
customers). Precisely, from the proof of Proposition 1 we have
VA,h = μ(θh − θl)uA,l + (1− μ)(θh − θl)uP,l. (4)
Results are now ambiguous as we already know that a change in π has the opposite effect
on uA,l and uP,l. In fact, the proof of Corollary 4 shows that generally both the set of
parameters for which the overall effect on VA,h is positive and that where it is negative
are non-empty. We can make further progress by requiring that C 000 is zero.16 With this
specification, contracts in Case 2 stipulate
uA,l =
1
2c
∙
θl −
µ
μ
1− μ
¶µ
1− π + πμ
π
¶
(θh − θl)
¸
,
uP,l =
1
2c
∙
θl − μ
µ
π
1− π
¶
(θh − θl)
¸
.
Substituting these contracts into (4), dVA,h/dπ > 0 holds if and only if
π < bπ := √μ
1 +
√
μ− μ. (5)
This threshold may or may not fall into the area that is covered by Case 2, i.e., the interval
(π24, π12), where both boundaries depend as well on μ (cf. Figure 1). As shown in the
proof of Corollary 4, bπ ∈ (π24, π12) holds only if μ is not too large.
Corollary 4 As the fraction of informed customers increases (higher π), the impact on
the utility of informed customers is generally ambiguous: It is strictly negative in Case 4
16Recall that C specifies costs as a function of the delivered “base utility”, eu(q), where q denotes
quantity and where the ultimate utility is given by θeu(q) for a customer of type θ. In terms of the model’s
primitives, stipulating that C 000 = 0 is then equivalent to specifying some utility function eu(q) = pq/γ
(together with marginal cost ec), where γ > 0. (We use here as well that C(0) = 0 and C 0(0) = 0.) Note
thus also that C00(u) = ecγ.
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and may be positive or negative in Case 2. With C 000 = 0, the impact is strictly positive if
and only if both π and μ are sufficiently low.
Most interestingly, for the case with C 000 = 0 Corollary 4 and its proof explicitly de-
lineate a parameter region for which, together with Corollary 3, all customers are better
off as π increases. From Corollary 4 this is the case if, speaking in the language of our
"reformulated screening model", the probability of the "top type", πμ, is not too high.
Finally, as there are more informed customers, also the impact on welfare is generally
ambiguous. While in Cases 1 and 3 contracts are not affected, in Case 4, where only
informed low-demand customers are excluded, an increase in π leads to a reduction in
welfare on two accounts: First, it reduces the service level uP,l; second, it increases the
fraction of excluded customers. For Case 2, instead, one can show that there is still
always a non-empty set of parameters for which total welfare strictly increases with π (see
Appendix 2). In this case, the positive effect that this has on uA,l is sufficiently strong,
compensating for the two negative effects on welfare, which arise from a reduction in uP,l
and from the fact that the newly informed low-demand customers now consume a strictly
lower service level uA,l instead of uP,l.
5 Information Acquisition
5.1 Extending the Model
Customers who are initially uninformed about their future demand (type) may be able to
acquire additional information before signing a contract. For instance, a customer may be
able to go through the records of her past consumption of the respective service, e.g., her
past phone bills, to get a better estimate of her future demand. To allow for this possibility,
we stipulate in what follows that at the contracting stage also uninformed customers can
observe their demand type, albeit only after incurring private disutility k > 0.
The game between the firm and customers can then be described as follows: At stage
1, the firm proposes a set of contracts. At stage 2, uninformed customers decide whether
to spend k to learn their type. At stage 3, customers decide which, if any, contract to sign.
At stage 4, every customer observes his type. Customers who have chosen the contract
that is targeted at uninformed customers decide which option in the contract to pick.
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In terms of the firm’s program, the possibility of information acquisition requires to
modify the incentive compatibility constraint for an uninformed customer. Her alterna-
tives, next to accepting the designated offer {(uP,i, tP,i)}i=l,h, are now threefold: first, to
reject all offers, as captured by the individual rationality constraint IRP ; second, to stay
uninformed and pick a contract designed for an informed customer; and third to become
informed and subsequently make the best choice among all possible options, namely to
either reject all contracts on offer or to accept one of them.
In what follows, for brevity’s sake we restrict consideration to the case where the firm’s
offer is acceptable to all types. Moreover, while the full program is solved in the proof of
the subsequent Proposition 4, in the main text we confine ourselves to the most salient
issues.
5.2 Analysis
If, in equilibrium, the uninformed customers did acquire information, the firm would only
face informed customers and thus a "standard screening" problem. The resulting optimal
offer would then clearly deprive customers of the incentives to acquire information.17 Recall
next from our analysis without the option of information acquisition that for high π the
"standard screening" solution was still optimal (Case 1 in Proposition 1). Intuitively, in
this case the option to acquire information has no impact. The remaining case is that
of Case 2, where π is sufficiently low and where previously (cf. Proposition 1) the offer
designated for informed low-demand customers was more distorted: uA,l < uP,l.
Given the additional option to acquire information, the uninformed customers’ incen-
tive compatibility constraint becomes now (cf. the proof of Proposition 4)
μVh + (1− μ)VP,l ≥ max {(θh − θl)uA,l, μVh − k} , (6)
where it has already been used that VA,h = VP,h = Vh. The first term on the right-hand side
of (6) arises again from the option to mimic informed low-demand customers. As VA,l = 0,
the uninformed customer would then only realize a positive rent, namely of (θh − θl)uA,l,
if she turns out to have high demand. The second term on the right-hand side of (6)
17As the consumer’s indifference can be broken by a marginal adjustment of contracts, it is straightfor-
ward to also rule out the case where the uninformed consumer would mix between acquiring information
or not.
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captures the new option to become informed at cost k. In this case, the customer will
instead realize utility Vh when being of the high-demand type.
Take now the values for uA,l and uP,l as obtained in Proposition 1. Once we substi-
tute for Vh, we can show that under the previously derived offer the option to acquire
information does not become sufficiently attractive for uninformed customers whenever
k ≥ μ(1− μ)(θh − θl) (uP,l − uA,l) (7)
holds. Note that this is trivially always the case if π ≥ 1
2−μ , where uP,l = uA,l = u
S
l (Case
1), which confirms our previous observation. On the other hand, if π < 1
2−μ holds, then
(7) defines an upper boundary on k such that we can only ignore the new constraint that
arises from the possibility of information acquisition if the respective costs k are sufficiently
high. Otherwise, the firm has to adjust its offer.
Proposition 4 Suppose that uninformed customers can become informed at cost k > 0.
If under the firm’s optimal offer all customers purchase a positive level of services, the
following characterization applies:
Case 1) If π ≥ 1
2−μ , Case 1 of Proposition 1 applies, given that the new constraint does
not bind.
Case 2a) If instead π < 1
2−μ and k is sufficiently large such that it satisfies (7), then the
contract specified in Case 2 is optimal.
Case 2b) If π < 1
2−μ and k is small such that it violates (7), then the optimal offer has
still the property uA,l < uSl < uP,l < u
FB
l as in Case 2 of Proposition 1, albeit uP,l is now
smaller and uA,l larger compared to the characterization there.
5.3 Comparative Analysis
In Case 2b of Proposition 4 it is optimal for the firm to distort the informed low-type
contract less and the uninformed low-type contractmore compared to the characterization
in Case 2 of Proposition 1. In fact, the difference between the respective values uP,l > uA,l
is then pinned down by the binding condition (7), which becomes
uP,l − uA,l =
k
μ(1− μ)(θh − θl)
. (8)
This implies, in particular, that for k → 0 both offers become the same. Intuitively, as
uninformed customers can become informed at (almost) zero costs, the firm’s problem
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reduces to a standard screening problem: u·,l → uSl . More generally speaking, as k be-
comes smaller, the firm’s ability to price discriminate between informed and uninformed
customers shrinks, which undermines a key reason for why the firm previously made the
(most basic) offer uA,l so unattractively low. This leads us to the following Corollary,.
Corollary 5 Suppose π < 1
2−μ and k small such that it violates (7). As the costs of
information acquisition k decrease, the difference uA,l − uP,l > 0 decreases according to
(8). For k → 0 we have that u·,l → uSl .
From Corollary 5 contracts for informed customers become thus more efficient and
contracts for uninformed customers less efficient as k decreases. To conclude this Section,
we ask—in analogy to the comparative analysis in π from Section 4—how changes in k affect
consumers and welfare. As with changes in π, this may also be of interest for policy,
provided that it aims to aid consumers in becoming more informed.
Intuitively, even though in the present model uninformed costumers do not become
more or less informed as k decreases (see, however, the concluding remarks in Section 6),
their expected utility increases. (This holds strictly in Case 2b, i.e., whenever both π and
k are not too high.) The effect that this has on informed consumers, however, is generally
ambiguous—as is the effect on welfare. As in Section 6, C 000 = 0 shall thus be assumed to
make further progress.
Corollary 6 Uninformed customers benefit from a reduction in their own costs of infor-
mation acquisition, k, while the impact on informed customers and welfare is generally
ambiguous. With C 000 = 0 we have that (i) informed customers benefit if and only if π is
sufficiently small and (ii) welfare always increases.
For C 000 = 0, a reduction in the costs of information acquisition thus benefits all cus-
tomers if the fraction of informed customers is not too large. Otherwise, in case this is
the result of a policy measure, this measure has distributional consequences: Uninformed
customers benefit, while those customers who are already informed are hurt. Interestingly,
however, for C 000 = 0 we find that the impact on welfare is always strictly positive. As
noted in the Introduction, this provides a striking contrast to the result in Crémer and
Khalil (1992), where in the presence of only uninformed customers a reduction in k always
decreases welfare.
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6 Conclusion
For many subscription services, tariff choice and consumption are separated to the effect
that, when signing a contract, a share customers are still uncertain about their future
level of demand. This paper considers the contract design problem of a monopolist facing
both uninformed customers and customers who at the contracting stage are already in-
formed about their demand (type). In an extension we also allow for the possibility that
uninformed customers can acquire information at costs.
Initially, the firm thus faces both informed and uninformed customers, as well as in-
formed costumers with high or low demand. The respective share of informed vs. unin-
formed and high- vs. low-demand types determines the prevailing distortion of contracts
as well as whether all customers are served in the first place. The restriction to only two
types allows to make this case distinction explicit and transparent. In the comparative
analysis, it is further found that the presence of informed customers benefits uninformed
customers even though information is only about a customer’s own demand. In particular,
in the present model there is thus no "free-riding" of informed customers (through be-
ing “cross-subsidized”) on uninformed costumers. On the other hand, policies that affect
uninformed customers’ costs of information acquisition may, however, have unintended
distributional consequences in that they hurt informed customer, who then realize lower
consumer rent. For a particular (workable) specification we found, however, that total
welfare always increases.
The tractable framework that this paper introduces may allow for several extensions
and applications in future work. There, it could be interesting to endogenize the differential
information that customers possess at the contracting stage. If customers have different
costs of acquiring information, those with low costs should become informed, while those
with higher costs should stay uninformed. The firm’s design of the price discriminating
offer would thus determine also the fraction of customers who are informed, while public
policy could more generally affect the costs of information acquisition.18
18In related work, Bar-Isaac et al. (2007) analyze the decision of the firm to facilitate information
acquisition for consumers with heterogeneous preferences.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof proceeds in several steps.
Step 1: If the optimal contract menu has the property that all customers take contracts
with strictly positive quantities, then we show next the following: (i) uA,h = uFBh ; (ii)
uP,h = uFBh ; (iii) VA,l = 0; and (iv) that the constraint ICCP is binding.
To see this, note first that if (i) does not hold, then we can adjust uA,h and tA,h so
as to keep VA,h constant, while increasing the surplus and thus the firm’s profits. This
is possible since in the relaxed program there are no constraints to mimic the informed
high type. If (ii) does not hold, we can adjust uP,h and tP,h to increase the surplus, while
leaving VP,h constant and thus also ICCA,h satisfied. Regarding assertion (iii), we only
have to note that in the relaxed program there is no incentive constraint for the informed
low type. Finally, assertion (iv) trivially holds in the relaxed program as, otherwise, one
can adjust tP,i downwards, while still satisfying all remaining constraints.
Step 2: Next, if all customers are served, we show that ICCA,h must be binding, i.e., that
VA,h = VP,h. To show this, suppose by contradiction that ICCA,h is not binding. Then the
firm optimally raises tA,h until ICA,h binds. It is trivial that in this case uA,l > 0 must hold
(so that VA,h > 0). Note next that if ICCA,h does not bind, then uP,l is optimally chosen so
as to maximize surplus: uP,l = uFBl . Substituting next the binding ICA,h into the binding
ICCP , we have the requirement that μVP,h + (1 − μ)VP,l = μ (θhuA,l − tA,l) = μVA,h. As
from ICCA,h we have VA,h ≥ VP,h, this requires that VP,l ≥ 0. If we substitute all of this
into the firm’s program, then the remaining consumption profile to specify is uA,l. For this
note that the expected surplus with this type of customers is π(1−μ)s(uA,l; θl), while the
information rent for the informed high type is πμ(θh−θl)uA,l. Moreover, from the binding
constraints ICA,h and IRA,l it follows that the utility of an uninformed high type equals
(θh − θl)uA,l, which in expected terms (for the firm) equals (1 − π)μ(θh − θl)uA,l. As a
consequence, we must clearly have that uA,l < uFBl .
We argue now that, contrary to the assumption, ICCA,h is violated as the derived
contract implies, in fact, that VA,h < VP,h. This follows from two observations: (i) VP,l ≥ 0
and uP,l = uFBl imply together with ICP,h that VP,h ≥ (θh − θl)uFBl ; and (ii) VA,l = 0
and the binding ICA,h imply VA,h = (θh − θl)uA,l. Since uA,l < uFBl , this gives VA,h =
(θh − θl)uA,l < (θh − θl)uFBl ≤ VP,h, which is a contradiction.
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Step 3: We now first solve the remaining program under the hypothesis that ICA,h does
not bind. Hence, because of Step 2 we consider the situation in which ICCA,h binds but
not ICA,h. It is then immediate that ICP,h must bind. Together with VA,h = VP,h ≡ Vh we
have Vh = θhup,l − tp,l = VP,l + (θh − θl)uP,l. The firm then obtains all expected surplus
minus “rents” that are obtained by all uninformed and informed high-type customers. The
former group obtains in expectation μ(θh − θl)uA,l, the latter simply Vh.
To determine Vh, we proceed as follows. From ICCP the expected surplus of an
uninformed customer is μVh + (1 − μ)VP.l = μ(θh − θl)uA,l. As from ICP,h we have
VP,l = Vh− (θh−θl)uP,l, it also holds that μVh+(1−μ)(Vh− (θh−θl)uP,l) = μ(θh−θl)uA,l,
such that jointly this implies that
Vh = μ(θh − θl)uA,l + (1− μ)(θh − θl)uP,l. (9)
Therefore, the total expected rent that goes to customers is
(1− π)μ(θh − θl)uA,l + πμ [μ(θh − θl)uA,l + (1− μ)(θh − θl)uP,l] ,
implying that uP,l maximizes
(1− μ) [(1− π)s(uP,l; θl)− πμ(θh − θl)uP,l] , (10)
while uA,l maximizes
π(1− μ)s(uA,l; θl)− (1− π)μ(θh − θl)uA,l − πμμ(θh − θl)uA,l. (11)
Step 4:We now establish a condition that the constraint ICA,h is indeed slack, as claimed
in the previous step. If ICA,h is slack, i.e., Vh > (θh − θl)uA,l, we have
μ(θh − θl)uA,l + (1− μ)(θh − θl)uP,l > (θh − θl)uA,l,
which is equivalent to uP,l > uA,l. To compare uP,l and uA,l from (10) and (11), respectively,
note that after setting up the first-order conditions and rearranging terms, we have that
uP,l > uA,l holds if and only if
πμ
1− π <
(1− π)μ+ πμμ
π(1− μ)
which is equivalent to π < 1
2−μ . Note that at π =
1
2−μ we have that uA,l = uP,l = u
S
l .
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Step 5: For parameters where ICA,h is not slack also ICCA,h is thus binding. It then
holds that μVP.h+(1−μ)VP.l = μ (θhuA,l − tA,l) = μVA,h and thus that VP,l = 0. Note first
that it is not feasible to have uA,l < uP,l, given ICP,h, VA,h = VP,h, and as by assumption
ICA,h binds. While it could be feasible that uP,l < uA,l, it is easily shown from uA,l < uFBl
that this is not optimal. With uA,l = uP,l we then have the standard screening program
and thus uA,l = uP,l = uSl .
Step 6: Finally, note that the solution to the relaxed program satisfies the neglected
constraints. In fact, the only case where this is not immediately obvious is that were the
informed low type would want to mimic an uninformed customer. Since ICP,h is binding,
we only have to exclude the option to ultimately select (uP,l, tP,l). This is, however, strictly
unprofitable as we obtain
VP,l = μ(θh − θl)(uA,l − uP,l) < 0.
Q.E.D. (of Proposition 1)
Proof of Proposition 2. To see first that it cannot be the case that only uninformed
low-type customers have a zero level of services, implying uA,l > uP,l = 0, recall from the
proof of Proposition 1, which solves the relaxed program, that in fact uA,l ≤ uP,l. Next,
if the firm only serves high-demand customers, then it is immediate that u·,h = uFBh and
t·,h = θhuFBh (Case 4). This leaves us with only one remaining case: Case 3, where only
informed low-type customers are excluded.
Note next that ICCP becomes irrelevant, but that now the ex ante individual ratio-
nality constraint IRP becomes binding: μVP.h + (1− μ)VP.l = 0. We show that ICCA,h is
binding. Suppose otherwise. Then the firm would propose a contract with VA,h = 0. In
order not to violate ICCA,h we must have that VP,h ≤ 0. Because of individual rationality
this requires that VP,l ≥ 0. But in this case the uninformed high-type customer would
profit from (later) choosing (uP,l, tP,l) such that ICP,h would be violated. This establishes
that ICCA,h is indeed binding such that VA,h = VP,h. For Case 3 note finally that ICP,h is
always binding. Otherwise, the firm could increase tP,h, while simultaneously decreasing
tP,l so as to still satisfy IRP , which would be profitable as it allows also to increase tA,h.
Having thus established which constraints must be binding in Case 3, note that the
rent of the informed high type is given by VP,l + (θh − θl)uP,l, which after substituting
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VP,l = −μ(θh− θl)uP,l from IRP becomes (1− μ)(θh− θl)uP,l. This shows finally that uP,l
maximizes again (10). Q.E.D. (of Proposition 2)
Proof of Proposition 3. Using Proposition 1, define the function eπ12 := 12−μ to separate
Case 1 from Case 2. Recall next that if informed and uninformed types obtain the same
("standard screening") contract, then only high-demand customers are served if μ > θl/θh,
which separates Cases 1 and 3. To separate Cases 2 and 4, we use C 0(0) = 0 together with
uA,l = 0 to solve from (2) for a function
eπ24(μ) := (θh − θl)μ
(1− μ)[θl + (θh − θl)μ]
such that Case 2 only applies if π ≥ eπ24(μ). Note here that eπ24(0) = 0, eπ024(0) = (θh−θl)/θl,
and eπ024(μ) > 0. Separating Cases 3 and 4, we proceed likewise and use C 0(0) = 0 next to
uP,l = 0 to obtain from (3) that
eπ34(μ) := θlθl + (θh − θl)μ,
which is strictly decreasing in μ.
The assertions in Proposition 3 follow then immediately from applying the derived
boundaries for the different cases. Note here, in particular, that all three boundaries
(eπ12, eπ24, and eπ34) together with the horizontal line μ = θl/θh intersect at a single point:
μ = θl/θh and π = θh2θh−θl . Q.E.D. (of Proposition 3)
Proof of Corollary 4. Implicit differentiation of (2) and (3) yields
duA,l
dπ
= − θh − θl
s00(uA,l; θl)
μ
1− μ
1
π2
,
duP,l
dπ
=
θh − θl
s00(uP,l; θl)
μ
1
(1− π)2 ,
such that dVA,h/dπ > 0 holds if and only if
s00(uA,l; θl)
s00(uP,l; θl)
<
μ
(1− μ)2
(1− π)2
π2
. (12)
To show that generally the set of parameters for which (12) holds is non-empty, as well
as the set for which the converse holds strictly, we consider parameters at the boundaries
of Case 2. First, for π close to 1/(2 − μ), (12) does not hold, given that in this case
the right-hand side of (12) exceeds one, while as uA,l and uP,l become close to uS,l the
23
left-hand side of (12) converges to one. Second, when π is close to eπ24, (12) holds at least
for sufficiently small μ. More formally, at the boundary π = eπ24(μ) the right-hand side of
(12) becomes 1μ
³
θl
θh−θl +
μ(1−2μ)
1−μ
´2
and thus tends to infinity as μ→ 0.
Next, for C 000 = 0 condition (12) transforms to (5). Note next that bπ < eπ12 holds if
√
μ
1 +
√
μ− μ <
1
2− μ,
which is always satisfied. After substitution into bπ > eπ24 and some transformations, this
condition becomes
θl
θh − θl
>
√
μ− μ√μ+ μ2
1− μ ,
which holds for μ = 0 but is violated close to the upper boundary μ → θl/θh. As the
numerator on the right-hand side is increasing in μ and the denominator is decreasing,
this implies existence of an interior threshold such that the condition holds if and only if
μ is sufficiently small. Q.E.D. (of Corollary 4)
Proof of Proposition 4. The firm’s offer must satisfy the new incentive compatibility
constraint
μVP,h + (1− μ)VP,l ≥ μVA,h + (1− μ)max {VA,l, VP,l}− k, (13)
where we already used that VA,h ≥ VP,h from ICCA,h as well as VA,h ≥ 0 from IRA,h.
We refer to (13) as ICC 0P . We characterize now stepwise the solution to the firm’s new
program.
Step 1: We first show that we can ignore the additional constraint ICC 0P in case the
solution to the relaxed program (see Proposition 1) satisfies (7). Take thus the solution
to the relaxed program (i.e., with k = ∞). Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that
in this case ICCP binds such that μVP,h + (1 − μ)VP,l equals (θh − θl)uA,l, while also
VA,l = 0, VP,l ≤ 0, and VA,h = VP,h = Vh satisfies Vh = μ(θh− θl)uA,l + (1− μ)(θh− θl)uP,l.
Substituting these expressions into (13), we obtain
k ≥ μ(1− μ)(θh − θl) (uP,l − uA,l)− (1− μ)(θh − θl)uA,l,
implying that ICC 0P holds from (7).
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In what follows we can thus focus on the case where condition (7) does not hold such
that ICC 0P must bind.
Step 2: Note that from the same arguments as in the proof of Proposition 1 it holds that
u·,h = uFBh and VA,l = 0.
Step 3: We claim that if ICC 0P binds, then also ICCA,h must bind such that VA,h = VP,h =
Vh. We prove this by contradiction and suppose that VA,h > VP,h. Clearly, as the firm
optimally increases tA,h as much as possible and as ICCA,h does not bind by assumption,
the constraint ICA,h must bind such that VA,h = (θh − θl)uA,l.
We next determine uA,l and uP,l. As ICCA,h is supposed not to bind, it is immediate
that optimally uP,l = uFBl . To determine uA,l note that from VA,h > VP,h and from the
binding ICC 0P a reduction dtA,h < 0 increases the utility of the uninformed customer by
−μdtA,h. Recall also that ICA,h is binding. Consequently, the choice of uA,l optimally
trades off the maximization of the surplus s(uA,l; θl) with the reduction of the rent (θh −
θl)uA,l(1 − π + πμ). As we assume that the firm serves all customers, we thus have that
uA,l solves
s0(uA,l; θl) =
1− π + πμ
π(1− μ) (θh − θl). (14)
Note that the resulting value of uA,l is thus strictly smaller than that determined for
Case 2 in (2). As also uP,l = uFBl is strictly larger than the respective value in Case 2,
we thus have that the difference uP,l − uA,l is strictly larger than the respective difference
for the solution in Case 2. Consequently, as by assumption (7) was not satisfied for the
solution to the original program (Case 2), where uP,l − uA,l was smaller, it must hold a
fortiori that now
k < μ(1− μ)(θh − θl) (uP,l − uA,l) . (15)
Note next that VA,h = (θh − θl)uA,l, while from ICP,h we have that VP,h ≥ VP,l +
(θh − θl)uP,l. Substituting into VA,h > VP,h, which holds by assumption, we have that
(θh − θl)uA,l > VP,h ≥ VP,l + (θh − θl)uP,l. It follows that
(θh − θl)(uP,l − uA,l) < −VP,l. (16)
As we have from the binding ICC 0P in (13) that −(1−μ)VP,l = k−μ(VA,h−VP,h), together
with (16) this yields the requirement
k > (1− μ)(θh − θl)(uP,l − uA,l) + μ(VA,h − VP,h), (17)
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contradicting (15).
Step 4: Substituting V·,h = Vh into the binding ICC 0P , we have that (13) becomes
(1− μ)VP,l = (1− μ)max {VA,l, VP,l}− k,
which clearly requires VP,l < 0 and which from VA,l = 0 thus yields that
VP,l = −
k
1− μ. (18)
Step 5: We next claim that if ICC 0P binds, then also ICCP must bind. Substituting for
μVP,h + (1− μ)VP,l from the binding ICC 0P and from (18) (together also with V·,h = Vh),
note that ICCP becomes
μVh − k ≥ μ(θh − θl)uA,l. (19)
Suppose, by contradiction, that ICCP does not bind. Then in the optimal contract
it must clearly hold that ICA,h or ICP,h (possibly both) must bind. We argue now that
ICA,h must bind. If only ICP,h binds, then note first that Vh = −k/(1−μ)+ (θh− θl)uP,l,
while an uninformed customer realizes μVh−k. It is immediate that the optimal offer must
satisfy uP,l < uA,l = uFBl . As then VA,h ≥ (θh − θl)uFBl , while VP,h = VP,l + (θh − θl)uP,l
with VP,l < 0 and uP,l < uFBA , we have VA,l > VP,l. This contradicts that ICCA,h must be
binding (as proved in step 3).
As ICA,h must thus bind, we have that Vh = (θh−θl)uA,l. Substituting this into ICCP
in (19) yields then the requirement μ(θh − θl)uA,l − k ≥ μ(θh − θl)uA,l, which clearly can
not hold.
Step 6: We claim that if ICC 0P binds, then ICP,h is binding but not ICA,h. To prove this
claim, we first argue that we can ignore the constraint ICA,h. This follows immediately as
by combining the binding constraints ICCP and ICC 0P (using step 5) we have that
Vh = (θh − θl)uA,l +
k
μ
. (20)
If ICP,h was also not binding, then the firm could benefit from simply reducing Vh = V·,h
(by increasing the transfer). Consequently, ICP,h must bind.
Step 7: Note next that, as in the proof of Proposition 1, we have from the binding
constraints ICP,h and ICCP that Vh is given by (9). Together with the binding constraint
ICC 0P this implies condition (8) for the difference uP,l − uA,l.
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We turn now to the determination of uA,l and uP,l. Note that, expressed solely as
a function of uA,l, we have for the informed high type Vh = kμ + (θh − θl)uA,l and for
the uninformed customer the expected utility μ(θh − θl)uA,l. Hence, trading off surplus
maximization with customer rent extraction, the optimal choice of uA,l maximizes
π(1− μ)s(uA,l; θl) + (1− π)(1− μ)s(uP,l; θl)− μ(θh − θl)uA,l,
where uP,l depends on uA,l according to (8) (i.e., duP,l/duA,l = 1). Given that we focus
on the case where it is optimal for the firm that all customers purchase a positive level
u·,i > 0, this yields the first-order condition
π(1− μ)s0(uA,l; θl) + (1− π)(1− μ)s0(uP,l; θl) = μ(θh − θl). (21)
Step 8: We claim the following: If the solution in Case 2 of Proposition 1 does not satisfy
(7), then equations (21) and (8) pin down a unique solution uA,l < uP,l < uFBl such that
uA,l is larger and uP,l smaller than in the offer of Case 2.
To prove this claim it is convenient to consider uP,l as the remaining variable, with uA,l
determined by (8). We argue first that when setting uP,l = uFBl and the corresponding
value uA,l = uP,l−y with y := kμ
1
(1−μ)(θh−θl) , then the left-hand side of (21) is strictly lower
than the right-hand side. To see this, note that the left-hand side of (21) then becomes
π(1−μ)s0(uA,l; θl). Take now as a comparison the solution uA,l in Case 2 as given by (14),
which as we know must clearly be strictly lower. The assertion follows then as at this
lower value of uA,l we have that π(1− μ)s0(uA,l; θl) equals (1− π + πμ)(θh − θl), which is
in turn strictly lower than the right-hand side μ(θh − θl) of (21). As a final note, observe
that using duA,l/duP,l = 1 uniqueness of uA,l follows from strict concavity of the surplus
function, implying that the left-hand side of (21) is strictly monotonic.
Step 9: For a comparison with Case 2 at the upper boundary for k, recall first that from
the characterization in Case 1 we have that π(1− μ)s0(uA,l; θl) = (μ1− π + πμ)(θh − θl)
and that (1 − π)(1 − μ)s0(uP,l; θl) = πμ(1 − μ)(θh − θl). Adding up the right-hand sides
yields exactly (θh − θl)μ. Hence, the solutions for uA,l and uP,l satisfy (21). Moreover, by
definition we have that at the upper boundary of k, where ICC 0P just starts to bind, (7)
is satisfied with equality, yielding condition (8). Q.E.D (of Proposition 4.)
Proof of Corollary 5. We claim that uA,l is strictly decreasing and uP,l strictly increas-
ing in k, where also u·,l → uSl for k → 0 and where at k satisfying (7) there is continuity
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with respect to the offers of Case 2. Using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 4,
monotonicity in k follows immediately from implicit differentiation of (21), which estab-
lishes that
duP,l
dy
=
πs00(uA,l; θl)
πs00(uA,l; θl) + (1− π)s00(uP,l; θl)
> 0
and
duA,l
dy
= − (1− π)s
00(uP,l; θl)
πs00(uA,l; θl) + (1− π)s00(uP,l; θl)
< 0. (22)
For the convergence (and continuity) results, note that we can substitute y = 0 for the
case of k = 0. Q.E.D (of Corollary 5.)
Proof of Corollary 6. To show that uninformed customers benefit from a reduction in
information acquisition costs, recall first that condition (7) just binds in Case 2b. There,
where offers satisfy (8), an uninformed customer becomes indifferent between her two op-
tions for a deviation: the option of acquiring information and mimicking the respective,
preferred informed type and the option of mimicking an informed low-type customer with-
out acquiring information. From the latter option, and as the incentive constraint binds,
an uninformed customer realizes μ(θh− θl)uA,h (cf. also equation (6)). As, from Corollary
5, uA,l increases in response to a decrease in k, the uninformed customer’s expected utility
thus indeed strictly increases.
Next, for Case 2b we know from Proposition 4 that informed customers obtain the
utility Vh = kμ + (θh − θl)uA,l. Hence, using (22) we have
dVh
dk
=
1
μ
− 1
μ(1− μ)
(1− π)s00(uP,l; θl)
πs00(uA,l; θl) + (1− π)s00(uP,l; θl)
.
This derivative is, in general, of ambiguous sign. In the special case that C 000 is zero, this
reduces to
dVh
dk
=
1
μ
µ
1− 1− π
1− μ
¶
,
which is negative if and only if μ > π.
Finally, using the derivations in the proof of Proposition 4, the impact on welfare from
a change in k can be determined from
π(1− μ)s0(uA,l; θl)
duA,l
dy
+ (1− π)(1− μ)s0(uP,l; θl)
duP,l
dy
,
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where we use y := kμ(1−μ)(θh−θl) . Substituting for
duP,l
dy and
duA,l
dy , the term is strictly negative
whenever
π(1− π)(1− μ)2s0(uP,l; θl)|s00(uA,l; θl)| < π(1− π)(1− μ)2s0(uA,l; θl)(1− μ)|s00(uP,l; θl)|,
which reduces to
s0(uP,l; θl)
|s00(uP,l; θl)| <
s0(uA,l; θl)
|s00(uA,l; θl)| .
This is always satisfied if C 000 is zero since uP,l > uA,l. Q.E.D. (of Corollary 6)
Appendix 2: Omitted Material from Welfare
Analysis
We first show that dW/dπ is sometimes positive and sometimes negative (depending on
the concrete specification) at π = eπ24+ ε for ε > 0 sufficiently small and μ > 0 sufficiently
small. Note that as π ↓ eπ24, we have uA,l → 0 and thus s(uA,l; θl) → 0. Concerning the
second term in dW/dπ, recall that duP,ldπ =
θh−θl
s00(uP,l;θl)
μ
(1−π)2 . Using that for π ↓ eπ24 we can
substitute π by (θh−θl)μ
(1−μ)[θl+(θh−θl)μ] , where
lim
μ↓0
lim
π↓?π24(μ)
(1− π)s0(uP,l; θl)
duP,l
dπ
=
∙
lim
μ↓0
lim
π↓?π24(μ)
s0(uP,l; θl)
¸ ∙
lim
μ↓0
θh − θl
−C 00(uP,l)
μ(1− μ)[θl + (θh − θl)μ]
(1− μ)θl − μ2(θh − θl)
¸
= 0
since the second term is zero in the limit (using that C is strictly convex everywhere and
that uP,l falls into a bounded interval). Concerning the third term in dW/dπ, recall that
duP,l
dπ =
θh−θl
s00(uP,l;θl)
μ 1
(1−π)2 . Note also that s
0(uA,l; θl) = θl for π → eπ24. Then
lim
μ↓0
lim
π↓?π24(μ)
πs0(uA,l; θl)
duA,l
dπ
= − θl
C 00(0)
lim
μ↓0
[θl + (θh − θl)μ] = −
θ2l
C 00(0)
,
which is a finite number as C is everywhere strictly convex. We thus have that
lim
μ↓0
lim
π↓?π24(μ)
dW
dπ
= −[lim
μ↓0
lim
π↓?π24(μ)
s(uP,l; θl)−
θ2l
C 00(0)
],
which may be positive or negative.
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We next show that dW/dπ > 0 holds at π = eπ12− ε for ε > 0 sufficiently small. To see
this, note that as π ↑ eπ12 we have uP,l → uSl and uA,l → uSl . Hence, we have that
lim
π↑?π12
dW
dπ
= (θh − θl)
s0(uSl ; θl)
s00(uSl ; θl)
lim
π↑?π12
µ
μ(1− μ)
1− π −
μ
π
¶
= 0,
implying that W is indeed locally increasing in π at eπ12 − ε, for ε sufficiently small, if we
can show that W is locally concave in a neighborhood to the left of eπ12. Using continuity,
it thus remains to be shown that limπ↑?π12
d2W
dπ2 < 0. Using
d2W
dπ2
= −(1− μ)[s0(uP,l; θl)− s0(uA,l; θl)]
+(θh − θl)
(s00(uP,l; θl))2 − s0(uP,l; θl)s000(uP,l; θl)
(s00(uP,l; θl))2
μ(1− μ)
1− π
+(θh − θl)
s0(uP,l; θl)
s00(uP,l; θl)
μ(1− μ)
(1− π)2 + (θh − θl)
s0(uA,l; θl)
s00(uA,l; θl)
μ
π2
−(θh − θl)
(s00(uA,l; θl))2 − s0(uA,l; θl)s000(uP,l; θl)
(s00(uA,l; θl))2
μ
π
,
we have that
lim
π↑?π12
d2W
dπ2
= (θh − θl) =
(s00(uSl ; θl))
2 − s0(uSl ; θl)s000(uSl ; θl)
(s00(uSl ; θl))2
lim
π↑?π12
µ
μ(1− μ)
1− π −
μ
π
¶
+(θh − θl)
s0(uSl ; θl)
s00(uSl ; θl)
lim
π↑?π12
µ
μ(1− μ)
(1− π)2 +
μ
π
¶
,
which from limπ↑?π12
³
μ(1−μ)
1−π −
μ
π
´
= 0, s0 > 0, and s00 = −C 00 < 0 transforms to
(θh − θl)
s0(uSl ; θl)
s00(uSl ; θl)
lim
π↑?π12
µ
μ(1− μ)
(1− π)2 +
μ
π
¶
< 0.
Since this inequality is always satisfied W is locally increasing in π at eπ12 − ε with ε > 0
sufficiently small.
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